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A DUTY TO INTERVENE?

Hurrianitarian
Nonintervention

INTERVENTIONISTS OFTEN COMPLAIN THAT A policy of

nonintervention means doing nothing. And in the face of so
much human suffering, surely that's unacceptable. Surely, we
simply can't stand by idly? We've got to do something.
I agree, of course, that the kind of suffering that is going on
in our world is unacceptable. (Every decent person does.) But
that's really not the question. The question is-what the morally
right response is to this unacceptable state of affairs. Or at least,
that should be the question.
In most discussions, humanitarianism and nonintervention are posited as opposites. Nonintervention, we're told,
means supporting sovereignty, self-determination, statism,
the legalist paradigm, a Hegelian Myth, or what have you.
Humanitarianism, we're told, represents a care for the lives,
freedoms, and rights of individuals. And humanitarianism, of
course, means intervention.
But this is an imaginary opposition. Most of the time, the
truly humanitarian thing to do, the thing that really respects
human life, is to refrain from using military force. Most of the
time, interventions are simply too risky, imperiling innocent
life, to count as genuinely humanitari~n.
·

One might go beyond merely saying that we ou~ht to re?ect
life, of course. Often, supporters of expanded mtervent1onism assert a duty to protect life as well. They assert that there a
moral duty to intervene in case of crisis. 1
•
.
I say ((assert" rather than "argue," because t~e claim 1s
rarely backed up. One way one might try to bac~ 1t up ':ould
be to invoke an argument by Peter Singer. Accordmg to Smger,
there is a general moral duty to help those in need. In~eed,
most of us are already committed to this idea, Singer thmks.
Of course, Singer's discussion concerns humanitarian aid and
redistribution, not military intervention, but his arguments are
easily extended that way.
Consider the following application of Singer's argument:
1. Suffering, and death from a lack

of food, shelter, and

medical care are morally bad.
2. 1he Singer Principle (Weak Version): If it is in our power
to prevent something bad from happening, without
thereby sacrificing anything of moral significance, we
ought, morally, to do it. 2
•
3. The Empirical Claim: We can prevent suffenng and
death by supporting foreign military interventions.
4. Therefore, we ought, morally, to support military
interventions.
1. See, among- others, Oberman, "Toe Myth of the Optional ~ar:
Why States Are Required to Wage the Wars They Are Permitted ·
to Wage."
2. Peter Singer, ((Famine, Afiluence, and Morality," Philosophy and
Public Affairs I (1973): 229-243, 231. Note that this reflects the
weaker of two principles Singer discusses.
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Note the neat separation of facts and principles. Morality
demands that we help those in need. How we help is an empirical question. The two are different issues, and one does not
affect the other.
Most people who find Singer's principles plausible find
them plausible because of a famous thought experiment:
One Drowning Child
Suppose you are walking past a shallow pond and see a
child drowning in it. You can wade in and pull the child
out, even though this means getting your clothes muddy.
But this is insignificant compared to the death of the
child. 3

To Singer, this thought experiment illustrates the application
of the more gerieral principle just given. The only difference
between One Drowning Child and the case of intervention is
the empirical part. What is the same is a general moral duty to
help those in need.
I agree, of course, that you ought to wade in and help the
child in One Drowning Child. But this does not mean accepting Singer's general principle. For while it is true that there are
important empirical differences between One Drowning Child
and the circumstances of intervention, it's false to think the
differences in the one case do not affect the other case.
Consider the following variation of One Drowning Child,
offered by David Schmidtz:
One Drowning Child-II
A baby is drowning in the pool beside you. You can save
the baby by a process that involves giving the thug who
threw the baby in the pool a hundred dollars. If you do not
save the baby, the baby will die. You save the baby. A crowd
3. Ibid., 231.
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begins to gather, including several more thugs .-~1i-';,,-ti1i,w•,; ..
more babies. Seeing what you have done, the thugs
a few more babies into the pool. The babies will drown
unless you give each of the thugs a hundred dollars. More
thugs begin to gather, carrying even more babies, waiting
to see what you do. 4
Schmidtz's point is not that this alternative thought experiment
better reflects the world we live in. Nor is his point that helping
people will immediately turn our world into this. Rather, the
point is that the actions we choose will have consequences, and
those consequences matter. Or, more precisely, the principles we
choose will have consequences, and those consequences matterincluding for what principles are acceptable in the first place.
A duty to intervene is a standing principle to intervene whenever we can alleviate need. We don't need thought
experiments to know the consequences this might this have.
During the late 1990s Kosovo crisis, the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) sought independence from Serbia. 5 The Albanian
minority in Kosovo had long been discriminated against by the
Serbian authorities. In 1991, the Democratic League of Kosovo,
under leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, organized a referendum
in which an overwhelming majority of voters supported independence from Serbia. Rugova proposed a tactic of peaceful
negotiation with Serbia in order to work toward secession out
of fear for a Serbian backlash against the Albanians.
When Rugova's peaceful strategy failed to mobilize international support for Kosovar independence, more radical

4. David Schmidtz, "Separateness, Suffering, and Moral Theory," in
his Person, Polis, Planet (Oxford University Press, 2008), 148-149.
5. The discussion here follows Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 257ff.
and the references therein. See also Seybolt, Humanitarian
Intervention, 81.
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groups came to prominence, including the KLA, which openly
advocated the use of violent means. Because the KLA lacked
popular support and was weak compared to the Serbian
authorities, they settled on a strategy of deliberately provoking Serbian police and Interior Ministry attacks on Albanian
civilians. Their aim was to increase civilian casualties in order
to draw international attention and support, and eventually a
military intervention. As Dugi Gorani, a Kosovar Albanian
negotiator, said: "Every single Albanian realized that the more
civilians die, intervention comes nearer."6
During February 1996, the KLA started a campaign ofbombing against Serb targets, which lasted until 1998, when Serbian
forces attacked the KLA with heavy weapons and air support.
The Serb forces burned villages and drove hundreds and thousands of Kosovars from their homes. These attacks were quickly
condemned by the Clinton administration. U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright stated in March 1998 that "we believe that
in 1991 the international community stood by and watched ethnic cleansing [in Bosnia] .... We don't want that to happen again
this time." 7 The message was clear: this administration would not
allow the human rights of Kosovars to go violated like this again.
The violence continued, leading to the NATO campaign's
Allied Force. Once the campaign commenced, Serbian forces

6. A. Little, "Moral Combat: NATO at War," BBC 2 Special, March 12,
2000, transcript at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/
panorama/transcripts/transcript_l2_03_00.txt. Hashim Thad, a
KLA leader, openly admitted that "any armed action we undertook would bring retaliation against civilians. We knew we were
endangering a great number of civilian lives." See also discussion
in Seybolt, Humanitarian Intervention; and Hehir, Humanitarian
Intervention After Kosovo, 111.
7. Cited in Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 258, following J. Steele,
"Learning to Live with Milosevic," Transitions 5 (1998): 19.
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intensified their assault on the ethnically Albanian population
in Kosovo, with significant casualties, large numbers of refu3
gees, and thousands of additional civilian deaths as_a result.
Singer might object that none of this impugns his proposed
moral principle. But that would be to miss the point of One
Drowning Child-IL If a proposed moral duty of intervention
encourages thugs to sacrifice innocent lives so as to promote
their political agendas, that fact counts against the proposed
moral duty. The duties of help that we end up endorsing, if we
do end up endorsing them, better actually help the people who
need it the most. 9
Singer seems to think that if we accept that there is a duty
to save the child in One Drowning Child, then we must also
accept a duty to save the child in One Drowning Child-II. And,
by extension, we must accept the duty in cases of intervention.
Indeed, Singer thinks we have a duty to assist anyone around
the world who needs our assistance, even if this means bringing down our own living standards by a lot. (Possibly to the

8. See Seybolt, Humanitarian Intervention, 82. See also A_lan_ T.
Kuperman, "Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humamtanan
Intervention: Lessons from Economics," Global Governance 14
(2008): 219-240, offering additional evidence about Kosovo and
similar dynamics more recently in Sudan.
9. It's worth noting that, in earlier cases, the international commu~ity has been quite sensitive to this issue. For example, during t e
imposition of a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, it was made quite
clear that independence for the Kurds was off the table, since as
Wheeler puts it, "any proposal along these lines would have sent
shock waves through those governments in the region that had
large Kurdish minorities. Moreover, legitimating secession would
have established a dangerous precedent that would have placed at
risk the constitutive rules of sovereignty, non-intervention, and
territorial integrity in the society of states." See Wheeler, Saving
Strangers, 158.
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point where the marginal disutility of giving help is greater
than the marginal utility of the help itself.)
But note that this is an additional claim. And it's one that
doesn't follow from saying that there is a duty to save the child
in One Drowning Child. It's a risky claim, too. After all, if we
cannot choose between saving the child in One Drowning
Child and saving all the vulnerable people in the world, we will
be forced to choose between having to save everyone and having to save no one. And in that case, we may be forced to choose
no one. That would be an even greater tragedy.

PEOPLE AND PLACES

If interventionism. isn't humanitarian, that doesn't mean any
kind of nonintervention is humanitarian. No policy exists in a
vacuum, and what we surround it with matters. Humanitarian
nonintervention has to be made that way.
The aim of the interventionist is to bring peace and stability to places where people are forced to live under conditions
of oppression, conflict, and war. But there are two variables
to this equation: the people and the places in which they live.
Unfortunately, the quality of the institutions that govern places
is highly inert. Bad institutions incentivize political and social
elites to keep them bad. Their extractive ways of life depend on
it. And there isn't much that we as outsiders can do about it
Fortunately, the people living in these places are not so
inert. They can and often are willing to move. And we, as outsiders, can make it much easier for them to do so. The truly
humanitarian response to suffering and oppression around the
world, then, is not to try and fix other countries through the
use of violence. The truly humanitarian response is to make
it as easy as possible for those who are forced to live in these ·
countries to leave for better places.
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Unfortunately, in our world, few people have the opportunity to improve their lives in this way. Every safe and prosperous country in our world tries its best to keep immigrants
out. They put up fences and walls, and post them with armed
guards. They patrol their coastal waters, monitor airports, and
so on. Millions who nevertheless see themselves forced to flee
their homes in places like Syria, Iraq, and Sudan end up spending years in camps, in legal limbo while their asylum applications are pending, and so on.
A policy of humanitarian nonintervention is not a policy
of maintaining the status quo. It requires significant and deep
changes to politics as usual. But this does not tell in favor of
more intervention. After all, intervention is politics as usual.
The fact that this has not reduced conflict, disorder, and misery
around the world is no reason for wanting more of it. Quite the
·opposite.
The real tragedy is the combination of this impermissible
stance on intervention with the also impermissible position of
keeping immigrants out. Indeed, I find it difficult to think of a
more atrocious combination of policies than, on the one hand,
an overly interventionist foreign policy, exporting violence in
order to silence our conscience while on the other hand, doing
one's best to trap the victims of this violence where it hurts the
most. 10

10. Of course, there is just as much political opposition to freer
immigration as to long-lasting nation-building. However, and
contrary to intervention, immigration does have a history of success. So, while I see no reason to think that governments will
become willing to support long-lasting foreign nation-building,
the prospects for more open immigration policies may be better.

